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RE:

DISSENT OF COl'1MISSIONER J. CLAY S1'1ITH, JR.
VOTE OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYHENT OPPORTUNITY COM}!ISSION
ON THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER TITLE VII
AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT ON JULY 1, 1980

.

The view$', of the members of the EEOC were requested on the
t

above captioned issues by the Department of Justice.

Justice

will represent the interest of the U.S. Government in a matter
before the Supreme Court raising the contribution issues.
On July 1, 1980, the General Counsel brought two major
issues before the Commission for consideration and approval.
In broad terms, the first issue presented was whether as a
matter of policy the EEOC opposes the right of an employer to

'.

sue a union for contribution where both parties' joint conduct may

:.

result

in a

violat~n

of Title VII.

The second issue

presented the same question as it relates to violations of the
Equal Pay Act.

On the first issue the majority voted not to

support'a policy of contribution (with Commissioners Smith and
Walsh dissenting).
to support

~

On the second issue the majority voted not

policy of contribution (with Commissioner Smith,

~ .:,.

alone, dissenting).

Because of the importance of these questions,

I submit my views for the official min·utes for association with
my dissents and to be associated with any communications
supported by the majority transmitted to the Department of
Justice, or elsewhere.
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BACKGROUND
Two years ago the Commission approved the General
Counsel advancing the position that a party found guilty of

!

violating Title VIr had a right to contribution against any
other party who participated in the wrong-doing.

The

Connnissi€>n took this position in an amicus· curIae brief in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transpor·tation Workers· Union of
America, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Citing prominent

authority, the EEOC's brief stated:
"/G/eneral principles of justice require

..•
'

that in the case of a common obligation,
the discharge of it by one of the obligors
without proportionate payment from the
other, gives the latter an

advant~ge

he is not equitably entitled."

to which

(Commission

brief at p. 20)

Nothing has changed in law or in fact which warrants the
Commission reversing this original position.

Indeed, our

position is stronger now than when the Commission first endorsed
the principle of contribution since the only two "Courts of
Appeals which have considered the issue have both ruled that
Title VII defendants have a right to contribution
parties responsible for the discrimination.

fro~

other

See· No"rthwest

Air1ine·s , Inc. v. Transportation Workers Un'i"ono"f AIne·rica 1
606 F. 2d 1350 (D. C. Cir. 1979) and G1us v.· Murphy,
_

F.2d

. _~~_, CJ,rd Cir.) (No. 79-1507, 1508), decided June 27, 1980.
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Both Courts of Appeals held that contribution furthers
the mission of Title VII in eliminating invidious employment
"-

discrimination!', The Title VII statutory scheme and EEOC
implementing regulations were designed with the expectation that
if a union jointly participates in an unlawful employment practice
See EEOC Compliance Manual,

it would·be held monetarily liable.

Sec. 201.5 (b) (Employers as aggr.ieved persons).
In the GIlls decision, supra, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham
pointed out that the very terms of Title VII establish that
unions are .to be held financially liable with employers for

'.

As his opinion points out, while Section 703(a)

unlawful.~cts.

of Title VII, 42 U.S-.C. 2000e-2(c)(3) holds a union liable
not only for discriminatory actions in which it independently
engages but also when it "causelsl or attempt/s/to cause an
employer to discriminate against an individual . .

" The

backpay provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) is
applicable :to unions and employers alike.
Judge Higginbotham opined:
"These provisions reflect a statutory policy
that the responsibility for monetary relief
should be borne by both unions and employers
to the extent that they are responsible for
violations of Title VII.

A

r~ght

butio!'} 'vould achieve this' goal.
added)

I~

of

cont~i

(emphasis

contrast, a holding that there is

no ri£ht of contribution under Title VII
~

.~.

.
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would release some individuals from
liability."

Glus v. Murphy, 's'upra at

-t

't;~

p.

14,

slip opinion.

In addition to this language, Judge Higginbotham provided
five ,oth~r in,dep.enderit anG: iI:!p'ortant p:61i'cy' consi,detatiQns '
supporting the majority opinion of the court which are too
persuasive for me to cast my lot with the majority of the
Comrndssion on the Title VII issue:

'.
1. :. Po li'cy :

Joint Elimination 'o'f Dis'crimitia't'i'on.

Quoting

Albermarle Paper Co: v. Hoody, 422 U. s. 405, 417-418 (1975),
Judge Higginbotham stated,
f

2.

It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay
'award that "provide/s/ the spur or catalyst which
causes employers and-unions to self-examine and to
self-evaluate their employment practice and to
endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominous page
~n this country's history."
Id. at 15 (slip opinion).
Policy:

Vigilance During Collective Bargain'ing.

Judge Higginbotham stated,
Under a rule of contribution "/b/oth union and
employer will knov7 that they both must be vigilant
to es chevl un lavlful dis crimina tion and that the
employee's ?redilections as to whom to sue will n'ot
insure either immunity froQ the mandates of the
la~v. If
Ibid.. (emphasis added)
3.

Policy:

Contribution Favors Conciliation\

Judge

HigginbothaT:l stated,

~.

A right of contribution would also serve the Title VII
policy of favoring conciliation and settlement of
these claims. II/f/ooperation and voluntary compliance
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/a/re the preferred means for achieving" the goal
or equality of employment opportunities. Ibid.

4.

Poliiy:' Prevents Unjust Enrichment.
,..
stated,

Judge Higginbotham

Further, t~e con~ribution :u1e prevents a plaintiff
fro~ ~ecom7~g unjustly enr1ched either by collusive
~ ~ct1V1ty w1th one of the defendants, or bv threaten1ng.one ~efendant that the suit will be brought only
aga1nst 1t, thereby forcing an unjustified settlement.
Id. at 16.
5.

Policy:

Tntent.

Contribution is Consistent with Congressional

Judge Higginbotham stated,

A·~right

of contribution would implement the congressional
intent to hold both unions and employers liable for
:. unlawful employment practice and would aid the conciliation and settlement goals of Title, VIr. ' Ihid.
Historically, the Commission has successfully argued in
the Appellate Courts that ,the 'hackpay provi.sion' ,of: Title VII
is prophylactic.
405 (1975).

See A1bermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.

By that I mean backpay is a preventative tool.

When an employer or union becomes aware that other institutions
are making backpay awards for violations of anti-discrimination
statutes, these persons have notice that if they violate the law,
they too are reasonably certain to be subject to monetary
liability.

Under contribution, unions as well as employers

recognize that they have

[0

active!y work to eliminate discrimination

because even if no charge is filed against it, a party to a
collecti'le bargaining agreement car: still
the other for past violations of

la~:.

a uni0B: is not charged because of l;ick

seel~

~bsent

0:-'

contribution from
contribution, if

kno\7ledge, inadvertence

DISSENT - 6

or design, the union may enjoy irrmunity.
The Commission majority reasoned, inter alia, that

ls inconsistent with the fact that some unions
,"!
may aid the Commission in proving employer violations.
contribution

Implicit in the majority's argument is the assUI!lption that
unions aid charging parties and the Connnission in eliminating
discrimination.

However, as the history of Title VII reveals,

the majority of unions have not been in the vanguard'in fighting
discrimination.
443

u.s.

maj ori ty .

See, United Steelworkers of America v. v!eber,

36 (1979), which tolls against the position taken by the
The .opening .text of the' vJe.b'er op inion

(which the EEOC applauded) st'ate:s ;-that ,l!btacks' ··/Fi.av~l lo~g been
excluded from craft unions l / . . .
" Footnote 1 is revealing:

1/ Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on 'racial
grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a
proper subject for judicial notice.

See, e.g., United

States v. International Union of Elevator 'Contractors,
538 F.2d 1012, (CA3 1976); Associated General Contractors
of 1'1assachusetts v. Alshuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (CAl 1973);
Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilve, 471
F.2d 680, (CA7 1972); Contractors Association of Eas'tern
Pennsylvania v. Secret'ary 'of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159,
(CA3 1971); Local 53 'of International Ass'oci"a:tion 'of Heat

& Frost, etc. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, (CAS 1969);
Buckner v. Goodyear, 339 F.Supp. 1108, (ND, Ala. 1972),
aff'd without opinion, 475 F.2d 1287, (CAS 1973).
~j'

See

also, United States Commission on Civil Rights, The
Challenge Ahead:

~Qllal

Opportunity in Referral Unions

-"

,

....
.....
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58-94 (1976),

(summarizi~g

judicial findings of

discrimination by craft unions); G. :r1yrda1, An
Americ"aIi fnilennna (1944) 1079-1124; R. Marshall and
~

"

1

V. Briggs,

The Negro and Appren"ticeship (1967);

S. Spero and A. Harris, The" Bl"a"ck" Wo"rker (1931);
Un~ted

States Commission on Civil Rights, Employment

97 (1961).

State Advisory Committee, United States

Commission on Civil Rights, 50 States Report 209
(1961); Marshall, "The

N~gro

in Southern Unions,"

in The Negr"o ahd the" ADler"ic"an Lab"or Movement (ed.

Jacob~~n, ~..nchor 1968) p. 145; App \ 63, 104."
:.

& Co.,

See also, R. C. WeaV'er, Negro Lahor (Harcourt, Brace
N. Y., 1946);

No~gren,

vlebster, et a1., "EmF"loy-ing The Ne"g"r"o" "In

American Industry (Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., N.Y.,
1959)

(Mono. No. 17); Van Deusen, The Black Man in ~1hite

America (The Associated Pub., Inc. 1938) (with particular
reference to Chaps. V and VI).
The fact of the matter is that there are some unions
which are good on equal employment opportunity issues and some
which are bad.

Norgren, Webster, Employing The" Negro In

Americ"an Industry, supra at 145; Harshall & Briggs, The Negro
and Apprenticeshj:.J?.: ci ted in Un1ted

Steel~'7orkers

of America

v. Weber, supra 35: n.l.

Simple justice demands, the principles

of equity cr:,'

bad~"eR

01.1i.:.

and the

to a collective tar-gaining
should be

pl~ced

of his tory urge thet no party

ag;~eement

vibich

in a preferred status as a

viola";~e.3
l:"::=tt"L t.~-:".

the law
(."if

administrative
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discretion, equity or distributive justice 'in: ,connection with
the contribution issue.

As applied to unions,

1

t~at

is what both

.

UIii,ted Stai:es:~o'urts:
:0 f.' Appe"als" :wliich nave: :consi:'oe~ed' ,the' ,is:sue 'have
,
ruled; that was the Commission's and the General Counsel's
original position; and that is what makes the most sense in the
fair

and~effective

enforcement of Title VII and other anti-

discrimination statutes.

Any other result impedes justice and

rewards the most discriminatory and recalcitrant unions which
for one reason or another have not been sued by the charging,;
party.

... Rights policy consideratio~s weigh heavily in
favor of :.the principle of contribution. Accordingly, I resp,ectfully,
Ci~il

diss'ent, fr'om' the maJori,ty t s .. pos,ition' .to" ":restrict ,~he right'. */

J. Clay Smith, Jr.
Commissioner
July 7, 1980
cc:

The Commissioners
General Counsel
Executive Secretariat

-'k/ Based upon principles of equity, the view, 'exp'.res·sed above 'is,
the reason why I dissented on the contribution issue as it
relates to the Equal Pay Act, It is within the general
equitable powers of the Federal courts to impose joint and
several liability on a union or employer for violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

